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CASE COMMENTS

the tax laws when this is necessary to accomplish the sound accounting practice of matching revenues against costs. To the extent that
Hagen departs from these decisions by denying a realistic deferral of
advance payments to the year in which the related costs must be
recognized, and to the extent that it requires inconsistent methods
of accounting, it is subject to serious criticism.
BRUCE H. JACKSON

REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
DISCOUNT ADVERTISING
A New Jersey statute,' which prohibits the advertisement of prescription drug prices by pharmacists, recently came. under attack in
Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills.2 Such statutes exist in ten other
states, 3 and the Board of Pharmacy has adopted similar prohibitions
by regulation in at least eight other states.4 These statutes and regu'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-12 (Supp. 1966):
The board may refuse an application for examination or may suspend
or revoke the certificate of a registered pharmacist or a registered assistant
pharmacist upon proof satisfactory to the board that such registered
pharmacist or such registered assistant pharmacist is guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct and the following acts are hereby declared to constitute
grossly unprofessional conduct for the purpose of this act:
c. The promotion, direct or indirect, by any means, in any form and
through any media of the prices for prescription drugs and narcotics or
fees for services related thereto or any reference to the price of said drugs
or prescriptions whether specifically or as a percentile of prevailing prices
or by the use of such terms "cut rate", "discount", "bargain" or terms of
such connotation....
293 N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (Chan. 1966).
2
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 651; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-241(c) (1960); LA.
REV. STAT. § 51:522 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 226 A(IV) (1965); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-148(15) (reissue 1966); NEv. RFv. STAT. § 639.215(4) (1963); N. Y. EDuc.
LAw § 6804(1) (d); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-15-19 (196o); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 736.1 (1963) (While this statue implies a prohibition of the advertisement of
specific prices on specific items, it may be considered a ban on all advertising.); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 390-5 (9)(ii) (Supp. 1966).
dColorado, Regulations of... State Bd. of Pharmacy, 48-1-2(d). 1(5);Massachusetts, Code of Professional Conduct for Pharmacy, Rule 20 (1961); Mississippi,
Rules 9&Regulations ...of... Bd. of Pharmacy, Art. IV, § 1 (recompiled and effective
1965); South Dakota, Bd. of Pharmacy Regulation No. E 13; Wisconsin, Administrative Code § i.i8. In addition the following states have peculiar deviations from the
above regulations: North Carolina does not have such a regulation in its Rules
and Regulations, but, nevertheless, the Board of Pharmacy does not permit the
practice of advertising the "discount nature of a pharmacy; Virginia has a regula-
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lations have been passed or adopted under the police power of the
5
state. As such, they carry a strong presumption of validity and the
6
courts are, therefore, reluctant to intervene In order to be valid under the federal due process clause, or its equivalent in a state constitution, such statutes must bear a relationship to general health and
welfare of the public and be a reasonable attempt to reach the specific
goal of the legislature.7 Yet it is questionable whether these statutory
tion prohibiting deceitful or fraudulent advertising, Bd. of Pharmacy Rules and
Regulations, Rule ii § 2 (c), and under this rule bans any discount advertising
on the theory that there being no set price for drugs, any claim of a discount
thereon must be fraudulent (This approach fails to recognize recommended retail
prices.) Washington has a regulation similar to the principal one but based on a
Virginia-type theory, but permit a pharmacist to advertise his "discounts" if he
posts in his store a list of the particular drug's regular price and records the same
with the State Board of Pharmacy. Rules and Regulations, Regulation No. 44. The
following states failed to respond to this writer's poll: Alabama, Kansas, Minnesota
and Tennessee.
rMetropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 58o (1935); Sproles v. Binford,
286 U.S. 374 (1932).
6
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). United States Supreme Court said in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963):
We refuse to sit as a "super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,"
and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the
Due Process Clause "to strike down state conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (195i); Smith v. Virgin Islands, 329
F.2d. 135, 144 ( 3 d Cir. 1964):
Whether legislation serves a public purpose "is a practical question
addressed to the law-making department, and it would require a plain case
of departure from every public purpose which could reasonably be conceived to justify intervention of a court."
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 11 (1911): "It may be said in a
general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs." See also,
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959); Daniel
v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
7Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962):
The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894) is still valid today:
'To justify the state in ... interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, First, that the interests of the public... require
such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.'
See Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928). (The Ligget case
does not represent a broad doctrine. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336
U.S. 220 (1949):) Staten Island Loaders, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n, 117 F. Supp.
308 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Southern Pac. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 13 Cal. 2d 125, 87
P.2d 1o52 (1939); Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco
Co., ii Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938); Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy
& Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 2oi (194o); Shirley v. New Hampshire Water
Pollution Comm'n, 1oo N.H. 294, 124 A.2d 189 (1956); Jones v. Haridor Realty
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prohibitions of prescription drug price advertising meet this twofold
test.
There is no clear standard for the application of this test.8 The
mere fact that the United State Supreme Court has set forth a federal
due process standard seems to have little influence on the state courts.
A good example of the divergence between federal and state due
process standards may be found in the treatment given non-signor
provisions9 in state Fair Trade Acts. Non-signor provisions have long
been held valid under the federal due process clause, 10 but fourteen
states have held such provisions in violation of the due process clause
of their respective constitutions." This same split in authority may
Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962); Guill v. Mayor & Council, 21 N.J. 74, 122
A.2d 881 (1956); Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 2o N.J. 114, xi8 A.2d 824
(i955); Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of W. Orange, 12o N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225
(1938); State v. Collins, 61 N.M. 184, 297 P.2d 325 (1956); Kraus v. City of Cleveland,
76 Ohio L. Abs. 214, 121 N.E.2d 311 (App. Ct. 1954); aff'd, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127
N.E.2d 6o9 (1955); appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956). A few cases have held that
the courts should balance the benefits to be derived from the legislation against
the infringement of personal rights. Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas,
153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957); af'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Myerson v.
Sakrison, 73 Ariz. 308, 240 P.2d 1198 (1952); City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 284 Ky.
684, 145 S.W.2d 851 (194o).
"See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34
MINN. L. REv. 91 (195o). "Unless the content of state due process is carefully studied
to determine which approach the courts of a particular state are prone to follow,
predicting the outcome of litigation in the due process field becomes highly precarious." Comment, 18 Omo ST. L.J. 384, 389 (1957).
DA non-signor provision permits a holder of a trademark to impose resale price
maintenance on the retailer even without a contract so providing. See, e.g., Amiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1422 (1956).
10
01d Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936);
Pep Boys, Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936). These cases upheld under
the Federal Constitution the non-signor provisions of Illinois and California respectively.
"Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 SW.2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 16o, 301
P.2d 139 (1956); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371
(Fla. 1949); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Shakespeare
Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268
(1952); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis &. Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d
6o8 (1955); Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967
(1957); Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 8o Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964);
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d
481 (1958); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961);
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957); Remington
Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1, 345 P.2d io85 (1959) (Non-signor provision in
excess of police power under test identical to that of due process.); General Electric
Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 IV. Va. 491, 103 S.E.2d 310 (1958); Bulova Watch
Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962). Fair Trade Acts have been found
unconstitutional in their entirety in Alabama, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.
TRADE REG. REP.
6041 (1967).
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be found in other areas. 12 Nevertheless, no general trend appears, and
it is safe to say only that insofar as economic legislation of business
is concerned, some courts will be more demanding in terms of the
due process test than others.' 3 The distinction between the federal
and state due process standards should be kept in mind, for if a
statute is found unconstitutional on the state level, there can be no
14
federal question as to that issue.
Supermarkets upheld the constitutionality of the State's prohibibition of price advertising by pharmacists. Plaintiffs operate pharmacies under the name of "Shop-Rite" and utilize the slogan "Why
Pay More."' 5 The action sought to enjoin the Attorney General of
the State of New Jersey from enforcing the advertising prohibition.
The plaintiffs argued that the act was unconstitutional for a wide
variety of reasons, but it is clear that they relied most heavily on
the due process' 0 and equal protection 17 clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.
The gist of the plaintiff's argument was: (i) the statute does not
reasonably promote the public health, morals, or general welfare;
(2) while pharmacists may be considered professionals at law, in
fact they are mere merchants; (3)the statute regulates the commercial
and not the professional aspects of the pharmacy business; and (4)the
conduct of pharmacists is so strictly regulated in the dispensing of
drugs that the act under consideration in no way alters the duties of
1E.g., legislation prohibiting sale below cost has been upheld under the
Federal Constitution, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360
U.S. 334 (1959); United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., 7 F. Supp. 694 (D. Neb.
1934); appeal dismissed, 67 F.2d ioo3 (8th Cir. 1934). Such legislation has been
declared unconstitutional in the following state cases: Daniel Loughran Co. v.
Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201 (1940), State v.
Packard-Bamburger & Co., 123 N.J.L. i8o, 8 A.2d 291 (1939); Serrer v. Cigarette
Serv. Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947); Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538
(Okla. 1949); Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940).

"Supra at note 8. It should be noted that the author of the comment in the
Ohio State Law Journal says that states which apply the due process clause most
strictly tend to be the most reactionary. A review of the non-signor cases does not
bear out this theory. It is also evident that the dual approach to due process is
not diminishing.
'ADepartment of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
'5Save Way Pharmacy, a New Jersey Corporation, intervened on behalf of the
plaintiff.
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "[T]he guaranty of due process ... demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); accord, West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 381 (1937).

17U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
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the pharmacist or his relationship with those he serves and so the act
is functionless and arbitrary1s
Supermarkets, in rejecting these contentions, pointed out that on
rare occasions a pharmacist is called upon to compound his own
drugs, and, therefore, performs professional services. On other occasions, the pharmacist may "monitor" a customer's dosage and prevent
a possible overdose. By not allowing the public "to shop" for its drug
needs there is a greater likelihood that the citizen will patronize the
same pharmacist. Thus, the legislation makes the "monitoring" of
drugs possible. Also noted in Supermarkets was the possibility that the
prohibition of advertising would help maintain the high standards
of the pharmacy profession. These services and benefits directly relate to the health and welfare of the public and are, therefore, the
proper subject of legislative action under the police power. "Such
evidence, together with the strong presumption of constitutionality,
requires this court to adjudicate chapter 12o as constitutional."'19
In examining New Jersey's advertising prohibition, it is necessary
to apply the law and tests of the due process clause. First, is there
an evil related to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel20
fare to be corrected?
In order to determine the existence of a relationship between the
public welfare and the statute, there must be an initial consideration
of two things: (i) the nature of the statute or regulation, and (2) the
nature of the business regulated. In this regard, it may be noted that
a judge may take judicial notice of facts surrounding the legislation, 21
"but by their very nature such inquiries, where legislative judgment
is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state
of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords
support for it."22
(i) The New Jersey regulation may on its face appear to be a
prohibition of the advertising of drug discounts. Its effect, however, is
1"225 A.2d at 732.
2D225 A.2d at 738.

10Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).
=United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Boylan v. United States,
310 F.2d. 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1962).
In determining such questions judicial knowledge may be consulted and
relied on, and if from that knowledge, or from any other source, it appears
that the grounds upon which the legislature based its action are arbitrary
and unfounded in fact it is not only the right but the duty of the courts
to say so and declare the consequences.
City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 284 Ky. 684, 145 S.W.2d 85i, 854 (194o).
nUnited States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
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to allow tacit horizontal price maintenance, among retail drug stores,
without fear of competition by those more willing to reduce their
prices. 23 An attack on a statute on the ground that it is a mere subterfuge for price fixing will not, without something more, be sufficient
basis for invalidating the act. 24 Nevertheless, "if the dominant pur-

pose of legislation be to serve private interests under the cloak of
the general public good, the resulting legislation is a perversion and
abuse of power and therefore unlawful." 25 There is little doubt that
the courts are more inclined to strike down economic legislation
adopted under the police power than that which is clearly designed
to protect the public health:
[T]he legislature may regulate pharmacists and drug stores in
a manner reasonably designed and appropriate to insure competence and diligence on the part of pharmacists, cleanliness
of premises, the purity and safety of products sold, the prevention of the unlawful sale of narcotics, and similar health
measures.
When regulation is attempted beyond such matters, more
difficult questions of constitutional validity may arise concerning whether particular statutes, regulations, or policies, or
their application in particular circumstances bear 26a reasonable
relation to significant aspects of the public interest.
(2) The question of whether pharmacy is a profession is relevant,
for the police power of the state is not as limited by due process
when it is used to regulate a profession as when it is used to regulate
a business.27 Laws prohibiting price advertising of professional services
by dentists28 and optometrists29 have been permitted to stand. However,

nThe statute encourages the retail of drugs at the manufacturer's suggested
retail price, for the sale of drugs at discount prices necessitates high volume sales to
be successful. The prohibition of price advertising increases the chances of low
volume sales, for only through advertising of discount prices will the drug retailer
be able to attract a sufficiently large number of customers to enable him to reduce
his prices.
2Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 3o9 U.S. 310, 318 (1940).
rGundaker Cent. Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566, 567 (1956).
See also, Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J. 182, 78 A.2d 54 (1951). "The public health
will not be used as a pretext to aid one group in the community in the competitive
race against another to confer a monopoly in the sale of products." Loblaw, Inc.
v. New York State Bd. of Pharmacy, i1N.Y.2d 102, 181 N.E.2d 621, 226 N.Y.S.2d
681, 683 (1962).
-OMilligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d
504, 510 (1965).
2Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 Pac. 17 (1927).
2Basford v. Department of Registration & Educ., 390 Ill. 6oi, 62 N.E.2d 462
(1945); Levine v. State Bd.of Registration & Educ. in Dentistry, 121 N.J. 193, 1 A.2d
876 (1938); Goe v. Gifford, 168 Va. 497, 191 S.E. 783 (1937).
"Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
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some courts have noted a distinction between the optometrist and the
optician, 30 holding legislation restricting price advertising as it relates
to the former valid but invalid as to the latter.31 "To forbid price advertising by an optometrist is regulation of his practice. But to forbid
price advertising by [opticians] is merely regulation of their merchandising... Truthful price advertising is a legitimate incident to a lawful merchandising business."'32 Where price advertising by barber and
beauty shops 33 and gasoline stations34 has been prohibited, the legislation has usually been held unconstitutional.
While the practice of pharmacy may generally be considered a
profession, it is not so considered in the application of a license tax 35
or exemption from a sales tax. 36
[I]t [is not] necessary to discuss the ...contention that the
practice of pharmacy constitutes a "profession" rather than a
"business." Those words are popular rather than "legal" terms.
A minister's sermon, or a brief prepared by a lawyer, or a
physical examination of a patient by a physician, is not the subject of a sale, but a bottle of medicine is.Y
State v. Rones,

La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99 (1953); City of Springfield v. Hurst, 144
392 Pa. 643, 142 A.2d 19 (1958).
Contra, Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955).
OlThe optometrist diagnoses the patient's difficulty and, if it can be cured by
mechanical means, writes a prescription for the lenses. The optician must follow
the prescription in his sale of the lenses to the patient.
-"E.g., Booth v. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, 220 Ind. 276, 41 N.E.2d 622 (1942);
Ritholz v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 N.V.2d 283 (1944); State v. Ritholz,
263 Minn. 36, 115 N.V.2d 743 (1962).
3Booth v. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, 220 Ind. 276, 41 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1942).
3State v. Garrubo, 124 N.J.L. 19, 1o A.2d 635 (1940); Jones v. Bontempo, 137
Ohio St. 634, 32 N.E.2d 17 (1941); Haight v. State Bd. of Hairdressing, 76 R.I. 512,
72 A.2d 674 (o950).
34
Cases striking down legislation prohibiting large roadside signs: State v. Miller,
126 Conn. 373, 12 A.2d 192 (1940); Town of Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So. 2d 188
(Fla. 1955); Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100, 49 N.V.2d 80 (1951); State v.
Guyette, 81 R.I. 281, 102 A.2d 446 (1954)- Contra, Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Div.
of Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 65 N.E.2d 529 1946); People v. Arlen Serv.
Stations, 284 N.Y. 340, 31 N.E.2d 184 (1940). Compare the following cases which
hold requirements as to maximum size invalid: State v. Hobson, 46 Del. 381, 83
A.2d 846 (1951); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 238 La. 936, 117 So.
2d 64 (1960); State v. Union Oil Co., 151 Me. 438, 12o A.2d 708 (1956); Gambone
v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 1o A.2d 634 (1954). Also compare both above sets
of cases with the following which uphold the validity of a requirement that the
lettering on price listings be uniform in size and legible: Serve Yourself Gasoline
Stations v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 249 P.2d 545 (1952), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S.
980 (1953); People v. Arlen Serv. Stations, supra. The common thread in all of
these cases is the prevention of fraud upon the consumer and the guarantee to the
consumer that he will know the price of gasoline before he purchases it.
nLee v. Gaddy, 133 Fla. 749, 183 So. 4 (1938).
-Appeal of Biser, 317 Pa. 190, 176 A. 200 (1935).
8Ibid.
223

Ohio St. 49, 56 N.E.2d 185 (1944); Ullom v. Boehm,

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

306

[Vol. XXIV

Supermarkets relied heavily on the fact that the business of pharmacy was a profession.3 8 The decision stresses the analogy between the
business of pharmacy and the practice of optometry. 39 Yet, the analogy
is of doubtful value. An optometrist is called upon to make a value
judgment with every prescription he fills.40 But it was admitted in

Supermarkets that the pharmacist in more than go per cent of the
prescriptions he fills is called upon to find the pill prescribed and transfer the specified number of pills from one container to another.4 1 The
pharmacist is trained to obey the orders of the physician and, by law, is
prohibited from deviating in any manner from a prescription presented
to him. 42 Supermarkets places great emphasis on a pharmacist's educa-

tion as indicative of his professional status.4 3 While many cases dif44
ferentiate a profession from a business on the basis of education, it
should be noted that in many states certain non-professional occupa45
tions require specialized education.
Therefore, the New Jersey court may have erred in its finding that
pharmacy is a profession. Yet this finding, or indeed a contrary finding, goes only to the question of how strictly the due process clause
will be applied.4 6 At some point the justification of a statute must
return the basic question of whether it is for the general health and
welfare of the public. In this regard the court relied upon the pharmacists' "monitoring" of a customer's purchase of drugs. 47 It is mani*225 A.ad at 735.
"'225 A.2d at 734.
"°The optometrist diagnoses the infirmity of his patient and then fills out a
prescription for the corrective measures necessary and, finally, may fill the prescription himself. The nature of his work, however, is more mechanical than medical.
Even the optician who is in the business of selling frames and lenses on prescription,
must make a value judgment with every customer he fits, for he must be sure the
fit is proper.
41225 A.2d at 735.

"N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 45:14-16 (1962).

at 734.
"Dvorine v. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 A. 562 (1936); Teague
v. Graves, 261 App. Div. 652, 27 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1941); Board of Supervisors v. Boaz,
176 Va. 126, 10 S.E.2d 498 (1940).
"For example, barbers, Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-324 (1956); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 402 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 318 (1965); MASs. ANN. LAws ch.
112, § 87H (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-04-23 (1960); and undertakers, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 7643; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3108 (Supp. 1966); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 156.3 (Supp. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7-49(2) (1963).
"6See supra note 27.
'7225 A.2d at 737. It is difficult to comprehend the logical connection between
monitoring and the statute, but the court thought that advertising would increase
"shopping" for drugs and since people would go from one store to another, the
effect of monitoring would be lost.
"3225 A.2d
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Lest from the court's discussion of this service that it amounts to far
48
more of a hope for the future than an existing practice.
The other connection Supermarkets found between the statute
and public health and safety was its effect in reducing the chance of
drug adulteration.4 9 Absent competition from discount drug advertisers, the small retailer, not feeling the need to purchase large stocks
at their more attractive prices, would not permit drugs to sit on the
shelves and with time, to break down chemically. The court overlooks the fact that the sale of adulterated drugs is already regulated
by law.50 It appears evident from the above that a law prohibiting
the advertisement of discount prices bears no substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public.
Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc.,51 a case very close on point, held
such a prohibition unconstitutional. The regulation in Stadnik was
promulgated by an administrative agency, although the agency may
not have the authority to so regulate. 52 Nevertheless, it is clear that
the court addressed itself to the merits of the regulation 53 when it said:
[T]he rule has more resemblance to an economic regulation
prohibiting price competition in the prescription drug business
than it does to a regulation guarding the public health.... The
effect if the rule is that the druggist cannot advertise the price
of a prescription drug even though he is prohibited by law
from selling the drug except upon the prescription of a physician. There is simply no reasonable justification for such an ...
when the regulation is so completely
intrusion on private rights
54
lacking in public benefit.

Even if a relationship between the New Jersey statute and the
'%25 A.2d at 737.
4225 A.2d at 737.

mNj. STAT.
M140

ANN.

§

45:14-27 (1962).

So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962).

OId. at 74. Of course, where a legislature has not delegated broad powers to a
Board of Pharmacy, such board may not restrict or prohibit advertising by pharmacists. Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Peterson, 415 P.2d 21 (Ore. 1966);
Pike v. Porter, 126 Mont. 482, 253 P.2d 1055 (1952). Oregon Newspaper and Pike
also differ from Supermarkets in that the regulations in question were prohibitions
of all1 advertising by pharmacists.
ORule 2, Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, Aug. 27, 1958:
From and after September 15, 1958, no person licensed as a pharmacist
under authority of Chapter 465, Florida Statutes [F.S.A.] and no person
who owns a retail drug establishment, as defined in Section 465.031, Florida
Statutes [F.S.A.] shall advertise the name or price of tranquilizing drugs or
antibiotics or other drugs which can be purchased and dispensed only by
means of a prescription from a physician.
"14o So. 2d at 875. The subject regulation was adopted by an administrative
agency which may have been acting beyond its powers, therefore the Florida Supreme
Court may distinguish Stadnik from a case where the same regulation was statutory.
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public health and general welfare does exist, the prohibition of prescription price advertising is not a reasonable act as required by the
second test of the due process clause. The greatest fault with the
legislation is that it is a derogation of the best interest of the general
public, for it allows a continuation of the extremely high price of
drugs. A few years ago, Californians were paying the highest price in
the nation for drugs. 55 One of the principal reasons was the existence
of a law56 very similar to the one under consideration as well as a
fair trade act. Either one of these laws will destroy price competition
between drug retailers. This effect under fair trade legislation is
obvious. Under laws or regulations not allowing advertising, the
discount drug retailer is prohibited from publicizing his one advantage, lower prices, while it allows the regular retail drug store to boast
its advantages such as delivery service and charge accounts. The consumer should be allowed to know that he can get exactly the same
drug from one pharmacist for considerably less than from another5T
Because of its price fixing nature, the statute is not a reasonable attempt to promote the general welfare and, therefore, should not be
permitted to stand merely because a state has broad police powers.58
STAFFORD

AV.

KEEGIN

'Comment, 49 CALIF. L. RFv. 340 (1961).
& PROF. CODE, § 651.
5 For example, this writer's research revealed that a drug, Celestone, manufactured by Shering, has a wholesale price of $13.86 per hundred. Prices to the
consumer on this item vary in Lexington, Virginia, between $15.86 per hundred
and $2o.2o per hundred. This price differentiation should be brought to the
attention of the consumer, for he is often not in a position to go without the drug.
The majority [of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee] found
several.. . aspects of prescription (or ethical) drug manufacture which dis[One] was the rigid limtinguished it from its companion industries ....
itation or even negation of consumer choice, whereby the purchaser is wholly dependent upon the brand name prescription of his physician .... [Further] the subcommittee found that the consumer demand for drugs was
inelastic, that is, demand remained consistent in the face of price change.
Note, 18 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 101, 102 (1963).
'Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J. 182, 78 A.2d 54, 58 (1951):
If the dominant purpose be the advancement of private interests under the
guise of general welfare, there is a perversion of power. Police regulation
denotes such restraints upon property, trade, or business as may be fairly
imposed for the good of all. The power may not be exerted to serve private
interests in contravention of common rights .... The statute under review
is not sustainable if it is designed merely to outlaw trade practices, procedures and devices that would lower the price of [goods] to the consuming
public, for that would constitute restraint of trade in derogation of the
general interest,
5'CAL. Bus.
7

